In a style easily accessible to readers without a background in psychology, the author describes the current state of knowledge about human decision-maki ng and problemsolving processes. He also explains how progress has occurred in Ms field and what some of the central implications for management and management training are. In a final section of this article, the author provides responses to questions from the audience that significantly extend the scope of the ankle.
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you in touch with the curre nt fads, but the topic s we are dealin g with, learn ing and mana geme nt, refer to pheno mena mat are going on all the time in the real world . Profe ssion al schoo ls have an oppo rtunit y for deep conta ct with that real world . Thro ugh such conta ct, they can becom e the sourc e of the probl ems that we shoul d be trying to under stand in our resea rch. It is terrib ly impo rtant to build and main tain that two-w ay street betwe en psych ology and educa tion. I don't need to tell you how narro w that street was and how little traffi c was on it durin g most of the histor y of behav iorism ..
We are talkin g about a psych ology (prim arily cogni tive psych ology , but other areas of psych ology also) that is more prepa red man it has been for sever al gener ation s to deal with probl ems at the level of comp lexity encou ntered in real educa tiona l institu tions. Henc e there is some thing worth communi cating back and forth now. Psych ology , as a discip line today , is prepa red to look at real-l ife situat ions, appli ed situat ions, as a sourc e of ideas and resea rch probl ems in a way that psych ology a gener ation ago was not
RAT IONA LITY
Decis ion maki ng is a proce ss of consi derab le intere st to both psych ologists and educa tors who look to real-l ife situat ions for the sourc e of their resea rch probl ems. A centr al quest ion that arises imme diatel y, in trying to under stand decis ion maki ng, is wher e ration ality come s into the pictu re. We talk about the ration al, the nonra tiona l, and the irrati onal. I don't mean anyth ing very comp licate d by ration al. Beha vior is ration al, and the decis ions leadin g up to behav ior are ration al if it turns out that the behav ior presc ribed is well adapt ed to its goals what ever those goals migh t be. Ratio nality is the set of skills or aptitu des we use to see if we can get from here to there to find cours es of action that will lead to the accom plishm ent of our goals . Actio n is ration al to the degre e that it is well adapt ed to those goals . Decis ions are ration al to the exten t that they lead to such action .
Irrati onal? Well, that is easy then. Irrati onal mean s poorl y adapt ed to goals . As far as I can see, there is no such thing as exces sive ration ality; we use that phras e glibly but doubt fully. When you accus e some body of being exces sively ration al, you must have some thing else in mind . You must have a quarr el with that perso n's goals and not with his or her think ing.
Nonr ation al remin ds us of some thing else again . It remin ds us that the goals them selve s have to be postu lated some how in the decis ion-m aking proce ss, excep t insof ar as certai n goals may them selve s be instru ment al to other goals : We go to schoo l in order to get an educ ation or so we tell stude nts they ough t to. But some wher e there has to be a fulcru m for the whol e business. As Archimedes said, "If someone will give me a foundation for my fulcrum I can move the whole world." But he needed a foundation.
Those final goals, the things that somehow or other we regard as the ends in themselves (except insofar as they have side consequences and except insofar as they really are thought of as implementing other goals) have nothing to do with rationality. They must come from somewhere else. I will use the term nonrational to refer to those aspects of the decision process mat relate to these very final goals.
DECISION MAKING
Now what is meant by the term decision making? 1 use that term very broadly to encompass three classes of things. The first class is finding problems that need attention and attending to them. Our characteristics as human beings living in the kind of world we live in (probably living in the kind of world that human beings have lived in since the species was invented) have always provided us with a very large reservoir of potential problems mat might be attended to. One of the important skills we have to acquire in life, and one that has to be in view of our institutions if they are to operate properly, is the skill of finding and attending to problems. You might say, "Well, who has to find problems? I already have some/' When I speak about finding and attending to problems, I mean finding and attending to problems that are so important that they ought to be taking up the very small budget of attention that we really have. Those hours between getting up in the morning and going to bed at night are all the hours we can give, no matter how many problems are in our world. So, by finding and attending to problems, I am referring to setting priorities and setting those priorities appropriately. Deciding what we, as individuals, and what our organizations will be attending to is a crucial part of the decision-making process.
There is a second and more familiar (but not as familiar to economists as it is to psychologists) part of the decision-making process. Once we know what problem we have on our hands, we have to start thinking about what alternatives, what kinds of solutions, might deal with that problem. Solutions aren't handed to us. We are not given an inventory or a list of solutions. "Oh, you have a problem? Well, consider one of the following." Alternatives themselves have to be invented. The whole activity that we call design, the things that engineers and architects and, as a matter of fact, all the rest of us spend the bulk of our serious time doing is dreaming up, elaborating, and Grafting possible solutions to the problems that we have decided are our priorities.
Third and finally, there is the matter of evaluating those solutions and choosing among them. But if the first two jobs have been done well namely, deciding what to attend to and doing a good job of designing possible courses of action, then in many ways this process of evaluating and choosing I won't say is trivial but is really not the major part of the job. I have left Point 4 out, of course. I have left out the implementation, for mat is not going to be the major burden of this piece; but I will say something about it before I am done.
The decision-making process and the rationality that underlies it, or should underlie it, has been a central topic of consideration in the social sciences. All of the social sciences, in one way or another, have to deal with what is rational behavior and how it comes about My whole career has depended on that fact I have been accused of flitting from one social science to another, but the secret really is that I have been preoccupied with one topic, decision making and rationality, all of my life. It just happens that that topic cuts squarely across all of the human sciences because it is what we human beings are doing a great deal of the time. You don't really have to change very much, except a bit of your vocabulary, to move from one of these fields to another, if you stick to the topic of decision making.
ECONOMIC RATIONALITY
Rationality and decision making are necessarily central topics of economics, management and, of course, psychology. Economics has a very explicit theory about what is rational behavior, whereas psychologists talk less often about rationality and more often about thinking or maybe "good" thinking. And there are very considerable differences between the psychologist's and the economist's approach to rationality, which is the principal approach one finds in the management literature. In economics, rationality is looked at as something substantive. You decide what is rational by looking at the action taken. Does it in fact achieve the goals? We can call that substantive rationality. In psychology, the concern with rationality is procedural. How does one go about it? What processes have to take place? What mental processes occur? (The mind is again in the head in postbchaviorist psychology today.) What mental processes have to take place in order that decisions will be reached that are rational and well adapted to the goals? And so economics and psychology have gone rather separate ways.
I will say just a few words about economic theory before concentrating on psychology. You can see where my loyalties lie. The theory of economic rationality focuses only on the substance of choice, to the relative neglect of the process, and it really deals with only a third of the three parts of the choice process. Economic theory does not deal with focus of attention or emphasis; economic theory does not deal with where alternatives of choice come from; economic theory deals solely with the question of how, given a menu of possible actions, you choose among them. You all know what the answer is. You choose the one with the greatest utility; you maximize utility. Sometimes utility, by imperceptible steps in the economics textbooks, creeps over from utility to monetary profit. Or, if you are dealing with consumers, it may be wealth. But that is not the essence of the theory, that is just mismanagement of it. At the essence are two things, a focus on the choice among alternatives using some vague criteria of utility (anything can be poured into the definition of utility) and, second, people reaching for the best Nothing is good enough unless it is optimal.
Of course, that is where my concept of bounded rationality comes in. Maximizing utility bears no resemblance whatsoever to what we human beings actually do. The idea that we even have a conception of what would be optimal behavior in the complex situations of life is unbelievable from the beginning. In our more modest moments, I think we are willing to believe that the world is far more complicated in its structure than our minds are able to grasp in its totality. Therefore, we get along in this world by having some priorities, by dealing with the things that really have to be dealt with, and by finding courses of action that are not disastrous. That is putting it a little negatively; putting it more positively, we look for courses of action that are satisfactory. Well, what is satisfactory?
We have built into us a mechanism called aspiration levels. We usually make assessments of what the world is likely to provide for us if we work at it a little bit: what it is reasonable to expect to achieve, if we make good decisions and if we follow them out. So we form aspirations. Many, many years ago (it must be 40 or SO now), Fortune magazine took a poll of the American public, asking people how much more income they would have to have each year so that they would stop worrying about money. They got a very clear answer, and the interesting thing was that they got the same answer independently of the income level of the people they polled millionaires down to the rest of us. The answer was 1 need 10% more than I have right now." That is a very characteristic property of our aspiration levels. They adjust to realities; they adjust to our expectations, based on experience (our experience and the experience of others), about what is attainable. And that becomes a major standard by which we judge whether a solution to a problem is a satisfactory solution.
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Of course , we do this becaus e we are simply incapa ble of doing anythi ng very differe nt. Becau se of the limits of our rationa lity, we are simply not in a positio n to say: "Here are all the possib le alterna tive course s of action; I have evalua ted them; I know this one is going to work out best, so I will take it as my option ." There is a limit on our knowl edge. Who knows what the weathe r is going to be in Baltim ore tomorr ow mornin g? Or in Pittsbu rgh? There are limits on our knowl edge, limits on our ability to compu te, to work out the conseq uences of what we do know. And, of course , there is a further proble m, becaus e final values themse lves are not subjec t to a rationa l calculu s, they are simply posited . We also have the proble m, if we are talking about social action, of agreem ent on values . So for all of these reason s, we have to find a way of reachin g good decisio ns, reason able decis ions satisfy ing decisio ns, I like to call them a way that is consis tent with and compa tible with the limitat ions on our mental capabi lities.
We can someti mes "soup up" these capabi lities a little bit Writin g was a great inventi on becaus e among our terrible limitat ions is the limitat ion of short-t erm memor y. You know the difficu lty we have of keepin g more than one phone numbe r in mind as we go from the telepho ne book to the phone. But writing came along, and we can write the telepho ne numbe rs down, if we are clever enough to think of it. Today, we also have other kinds of help, many of them due to the compu ter, many of them due to mathem atics. We have had now, for 50 years, the discipl ines called manag ement scienc e and operat ions researc h.
How do operat ions researc h model s or manag ement scienc e model s help us, with or withou t compu ters? Most of these models are built around the econom ist's view of rationa lity. They try to optimi ze someth ing. In a socalled linear progra mming proble m, you define someth ing you are trying to maxim ize and indicat e some limitat ions of resour ces, some constra ints, and some bound aries on the actions you ought to take. Then you give this inform ation to your friendl y compu ter, and it reports out the optimu m. For examp le, if you give it inform ation on the numbe r of calorie s, vitami ns, and so on in each of the foods you can buy in your superm arket and the price tags on those and the numbe r of calorie s you need for a healthy diet, a linear progra mming proble m will determ ine the lowest -cost diet that will meet all of those needs. It will optimi ze. You had better like pork liver and cabbag e, howev er (it is not necess arily as bad as that, becaus e of course you could put anothe r constra int on the proble m and say no liver). When you look at how we use these manag ement tools (and they have shown themse lves to be extrem ely valuab le, especia lly at middle manag ement levels) to overco me our bound ed ration ality and even the bound ed rationa lity of comp uters we do several things. First, we cut the problem down to si?ej we horribly oversim plify the problem . We replace the origina l problem by mis simplif ied problem , shaping it carefull y, so mat it is within the bounds of whatev er comput ational resourc es and informa tion we have availab le. Having done that, we can optimiz e this approxi mate problem and thereby produc e a satisfyi ng solution (maybe ) to the real-wo rld problem . We shouldn 't suppos e that comput ers or numeri cal techniq ues or any things-of this sort have exempt ed us from the million -year restricti on human beings have had of satisfic ing instead of optimiz ing. It simply expand s a little bit our capabil ities of conside ring a wider range of solution s and evaluat ing them a little better. But we are still, in our thinkin g, employ ing severel y limited approxi mations to the real world.
PSYCH OLOG ICAL RATIO NALIT Y
Let me stop econom ist-bash ing now and move on to psycho logical theory and what has been learned about the actual process es that human beings use in decisio n making . We have made a very great advanc e, over the past 30 years, in our underst anding of the process es that humans use for arriving at decisio ns. Attentio n and motivat ion (how things get on to the agenda of prioriti es) is still in an embryo nic state. People are beginni ng to investig ate it now, but I can't report dramati c progres s yet in that area; give it another generat ion or so. The real progres s has been made on the second and the third aspects of decisio n making , as I defined it earlier: theories about how we generat e scheme s of action, how we solve problem s and how we arrive at choices as a result of solving those problem s. A good deal can be said today about these matters that is applica ble to real-wo rld situatio ns in educati on and elsewhe re.
How was such progres s made? As you have probabl y discove red, there are still a few rats in some psycho logical laborato ries. But, by and large, the rat is out and human beings are in. Not only are we willing to talk abouun inds again, but we have found some ways of studyin g the human mind. Now it should be made clear that rats do have some advanta ges, particul arly because you are allowed to do a lot of things with rats that you are not allowed to do . with human beings (especi ally if yop have a locaj."h mnan subject s" committee). Amajo r problem in any science .is how to find instrum ents that will allow you to look at the relevan t phenom ena.-W e have, gained a couple of-very ... powerf ul instrum ents in the last 35 years not as powerf ul as we would like, but very much more powerf ul than we had before.
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The first of these powerful instruments is computer simulation of human thinking. If you mink of a computer as some kind of device that crunches numbers, then you need to think again. Computers, of course, can be made to crunch numbers if you give them the appropriate programs. But they can be made to do lots of other things. I suspect that among those of you who use computers many more use mem as word processors than use them to do simultaneous equations (unless you've got your family accounts on a spreadsheet). So you already know mat computers do things besides crunching numbers. You know that they deal with patterns or symbols. You don't care how those symbols are represented inside the machine, whether they are electrical or magnetic or made of water or whatever it is (maybe, hidden inside the machine, there are those old IBM punch cards). What you care about is that computers are general-purpose, symbol-processing , or patternprocessing devices. For that reason, and because when human beings think they are also manipulating patterns inside their heads, computers can be used to simulate human thinking.
Let me be clear what I don't mean by computers "simulating'* human thinking. First, I don't mean that every computer program that is inverting a matrix is following processes like those that are used by human beings. Most of us don't even know how to invert a matrix, and those of us who do know would take far too long to do it to make it worth our while. So when computers are inverting a matrix (or when computer programs play chess), they are usually not doing anything that resembles very closely what a human being does when engaged in the same activity. On the other hand, there are some computer programs that can be demonstrated to be playing chess in a very humanoid fashion indeed.
What is the difference? The difference is that computers, as we know, are very fast We talk about strange numbers like microseconds, gigaseconds, and megabits. We talk of millionths of this and billionths of that; computers are very fast. The human mind, alas, is a very slow device. It takes approximately I/1000th of a second to get a message across a single synapse from one neuron to the next And, to do anything interesting, you must get quite a few messages across quite a few synapses. No human being can recognize his or her mother coining down the street (or father for that matter, or bi other) in less man approximately one second. Who would walk half a block to buy a computer that could not do the simplest act of recognition in less than a fraction of a second?
Clea iiy we hum ans cann ot do the gear spin ning that com pute rs do whe n they are crun chin g num bers or doin g som e of the othe r thin gs they can do. We mus t get by in som e othe r way . Wel l we do, and we know toda y pret ty well how we get by: wha t the othe r way is. Hum an bein gs are som etim es conf ront ed with a situa tion in whic h ther e are zillio ns of poss ibili ties. It is said mat ther e are leas t 1040 poss ible gam es of che ss 10* bran ches in the tree of "Ifl do this, and he does that, etc." The num ber 10" is 10 with 40 zero s after it, and I have been told (I don 't know who told me this) that that is mor e than the num ber of mol ecul es in the worl d. Som e com pute rs have been prog ram med to reco gniz e 10* poss ibili ties. Eve n with 10* you are hard ly start ing to craw l up the hill. Whe n such a com pute r revi ews 10* poss ibili ties befo re it mak es its mov e, it does not play ches s, it play s an appr oxim ate gam e of ches s. It simp lifie s the situa tion unti l it can mak e the calc ulati ons. Tha t mea ns it pret ends that ther e are only 10s posi tion s inste ad of 10*, and it almo st gets awa y with it, prob ably not with a Fish er or a Kasp arov , but with mos t of the rest of us.
Wha t does a hum an ches s play er do? We have very good evid ence abou t this. Che ss has been the Dro soph ila of artif icial intel ligen ce rese arch . It is a stan dard orga nism for a grea t deal of rese arch , start ing back a long way , but part icula rly with the Dutc h psyc holo gist, Adr iaan DeG root . The re is stron g evid ence that a ches s gran d mas ter in a diffi cult posi tion prob ably does not look mor e than 100 posi tion s ahea d, bran chin g thro ugh 100 poss ibili ties befo re sele cting the corr ect mov e. The re is also good evid ence mat that gran d mas ter does not look at mor e posi tion s than an ordi nary ama teur play er does befo re mak ing a mov e. Wel l, wha t is the diffe renc e, then , betw een the gran d mas ter and the ordi nary play er? The diffe renc e is that the gran d mas ter look s at the righ t mov es. The way we hum ans get by with a very limi ted com putin g capa city is thro ugh usin g a trem endo us amo unt of selec tivit y in wha t we look at. We solv e prob lems by sear chin g, just as com pute rs do, and just as cats do whe n you put them in a Tho rndi ke puzz le box. But we sear ch extre mely selec tivel y. We depe nd on a vast body of know ledg e abou t the struc ture of the prob lem situa tion to sear ch effic ientl y. And whe n we don 't have know ledge of that struc ture, we don 't do very well . The re are lots of prob lems that we don 't solv e; lots we don 't know the answ er to. Peop le have been tryin g to prov e or disp rove Ferm at's last theo rem for over 300 year s, and they still don 't have it.
We have used com pute rs to stud y hum an thin king by simu latin g it. But we have done this by writ ing prog ram s for the com pute r in such a way that, inste ad of spin ning its whe els very fast and tryin g ever ythi ng, it look s at thin gs very selec tivel y and tries to mak e use of the sam e kind of sly cunn ing (we call it heur istic rule s of thum b) that ever y hum an bein g uses in solv ing
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prob lems . To give you an exam ple, one area we hav e been stud ying in rece nt year s (bes ides ches s) is the proc ess of scie ntifi c disc over y. Tha t area was pick ed beca use nobo dy can accu se a hum an bein g or a com pute r that mak es a serio us scie ntifi c disc over y of doin g som ethi ng trivi al. Bec ause this is som ethin g we adm ire in hum an bein gs, if we can simu late it we hav e lear ned som ethin g abou t an imp orta nt hum an activ ity.
Kep ler foun d som e imp orta nt law s of astro nom y, one of whi ch is his third law. It is a very simp le law to state . The plan ets are goin g arou nd the sun with a cert ain peri od of revo lutio n, and they are at vari ous dist ance s from the sun. Cop erni cus was prob ably the first who arriv ed at reas onab le estim ates of the dista nces ; the peri ods hav e been kno wn sinc e anci ent time s, and the prob lem was first addr esse d by Aris totle . Kep ler took as his prob lem the exp lana tion of the rela tion betw een thes e peri ods and the dista nces . It is wel l kno wn that the oute r plan ets, thos e farth er from the sun, take long er to get arou nd the sun than the near er ones . Afte r a lot of wor k, Kep ler arriv ed/a t wha t we call Kep ler's third law: The peri od vari es with the Vi pow er of the dista nce. In our labo rato ry, we have a little com pute r prog ram ; we call it Bac on, afte r Sir Fran cis, beca use like Sir Fran cis it is very fond of indu ctio n. You can give Bac on data ; you can, in fact , give it exac tly the sam e data that Kep ler had abou t the peri ods of the plan ets and thei r dista nces from the sun. If you don 't have his data avai labl e, you can get them from the Wor ld Alm ana c. If you give Bac on that data , afte r a little whi le Bac on will find (Ba con 's job in life is to find regu larit y in any data you give it) a law con nect ing the peri ods and the dista nces , and the law will be Kep ler's law.
In the case of the com pute r, we can find out wha t hap pen s in the "dis cove ry" of Kep ler's law step by step : It's a little too late to ask Kep ler. We ask the com pute r to pick out a patt ern. It gets the answ er on the third try. Now ther e are an infin ite num ber of mat hem atica l func tion s to test with thos e data . Why is Bac on succ essf ul on the third try? It is succ essf ul beca use it doe sn't sear ch rand oml y or by brut e forc e; it sear ches very sele ctiv ely, tryin g to mak e use of the resu lt of each step U.ta kes Jo extr act info rma tion that wifl sugg est wha t it shou ld try next . It Jurs t tries a'lin ear func tion , the ntn ries a1 quad ratic , and from the misf it of thes e func tion s to the data it figu res out that * the prop er func tion is the Vi pow erfin tere stin gly eno ugh , Kep ler also mad e' -at leas t seve ral tries , beca use he pub lishe d, an earl ier and inco rrec t solu tion with the sam e quad ratic law that Bac on gets on its* seco nd try. Bac on kep t goin g, and so, ultim ately , did Kep ler, and they both got it on the third try.
I don 't wan t to expl ain Bac on at leng th. I do wan t to poin t out sim ply' mat , if you are able to intro duce into a com pute r the sam e kind s of kno wle dge and the sele ctiv ity that can be deri ved from that kno wle dge that hum an bein gs poss ess whe n we kno w som ethi ng abo ut an area , then you can freq uent ly get the comput er not only to solve problem s that are difficul t for human beings to solve (we knew comput ers could do that all along), but you can also get it to solve the problem in a very humano id way. You can show mat it is followi ng a path very similar to the human path, and in much more detail than in the Kepler exampl e. That gets me to the other tool mat has revolutionized psycho logical researc h: the so-calle d thinkin g-aloud protoco l.
THE NATU RE OF EXPER TISE
A thinkin g-aloud protoco l is obtaine d by giving somebo dy a problem and asking him or her to talk aloud while solving the problem . With some types of problem s, mis causes difficul ty, but, for most problem s, it in fact affects ( neither the solution path nor the time require d to solve the problem (there are lots of footnot es to put on that assertio n, but I will not get into them now). For many problem s, you can get people to think aloud. This should n't surprise us because many of us sometim es talk to ourselv es while we are solving problem s. Throug h this techniq ue, we have learned an enormo us amount about the steps in problem solving . Notice we are not asking people to give us a theory about problem -solvin g process es. That would be like going to a meeting of the physics society and having a Geiger counter on the podium giving a lecture on theoreti cal physics . Our subject s are not giving us a theory. What they are doing is produc ing data. but not just any kind of knowle dge, and not knowle dge just organiz ed in , V . . -. .. ; ., anyway . ~ _; ?-* ..-^ ^. ^ -,--. -,--_-'.,-'' > We even have a measur e of the-size of the body of the expert' s knowle dge or at least a measur e of minimu m size/1 am not going to. insist jipoji how.,. .
. , , accurat e this measur e is. In psycho logy today, we have a unit mat we call a chunk. That is not just a slang word; it is a technic al unit of measur ement of mental storage . By chunk, we mean any unit-tha i has become familia rized to the person who has it For exampl e, most educate d people will have a,. ..
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vocabulary of about 100,000 words. That means, if you see those words on a page or hear them from someone, you will have at least an approximate notion, or maybe a very exact one, of what those words mean. They will be familiar terms on the page. We spend an awful lot of time with children teaching them to acquire the beginnings of that skill. By the time they get to college, or certainly by the time they get their Ph.D., they'have around 100,000 chunks, or familiar words, give or take factor or two. So first of all, we know that, in any area of expertise, the expert in that area has 50,000 familiar chunks or more something of that magnitude. What do these chunks do for you? They act like an index to your knowledge. You have all sorts of things stashed away in memory, but they do no good unless you can get at them. In an encyclopedi a, the last volume contains an index. If you lose the index volume, you might as well chuck the rest of it out, because you could never find anything. So we have to have an index for what is stored in our memories. Now how is that index used? To recognize things. Any one of us in our area of expertise can recognize cues in the situations that we encounter in our daily work, and those cues immediately access, in our memory, all the things we knew about them. Medical diagnosis is an example. You walk into the doctor's office with some peculiar spots on you, and it does not take long for the doctor to say, "chicken pox," if that's what it happens to be. (There may be trivial reasons why he says that he knows that there is an epidemic of chicken pox running around; and some" times the best way to predict the doctor's diagnosis is to find out what has just been published in the Journal of the. American Medical Association. )
The fact of the matter is that any expert can recognize-th e symptoms, the clues, to the bulk of the situations that are encountered in his or her everyday experience. The day would simply not be long Enough to accomplish anything if cues didn't do a large part of the -work for the expert. Then again, " back to our Drosophila, the chess players; in the case of chess, the grand master in a tournament game will take, on the average, 3 to 5 minutes to make ' a move because that is all the time allowed. You 'might think mat a chess i., -" *-game is a very slow business, but time Is of .the essence for sotffebnVwh ols' . r . play ing. Many games are lost because of theofficial timelimits orHhe gamer -' ---. gi vena short time, you do stupid things. So time is of the essence. Now that ' -same grand master, having collected 50 people who will pay $5.00 each to . . play with him or her, can go around the table with those 50 players, spending ' " r ~ -: just a couple of seconds at each place making a move, going to the next one, another few seconds. At the end of the evening, the grand master will have " won 47 of the 50 games, drawn 2, and maybe one little kid beat him or her. Now how can that be? How can such instantaneou s play take place? It is very simple, if you are a grand master. When you go to each board, either you see a cue or you don't. If you don't see a cue, you just make a developing move; that is, you make a move that gets your pieces out into play where they are mobile. But sooner or later, because the opponent isn't as good a player as the master, he or she will make a move that creates a situation on the board that the grand master can recognize as a weakness in the opponent's position. And then the master does what memory tells him or her to do in those positions. There is no problem to solve. The experts see the cues staring in their faces and respond accordingly, and at the end of the evening they have won 47 of the SO games. That is the way experts get through the day.
That raises a question that has been debated a great deal. Let me put it in a paradoxical form. The question is whether human reasoning or thinking is 'logical" and whether it would be a good thing if it were. We hear conflicting opinions about this. There is, in fact, a good deal of sentiment around that says, "All thinking is logical." When this is said, others object that something besides logic has to enter in. Well, partly we are quarreling about definitions of words, and partly we are quarreling about a phenomenon. The people who question whether thinking is logical will claim that may of the best decisions that people make are intuitive or based on insight or on judgment. What is intuition and what is insight and what is judgment? How do we decide that somebody is exhibiting intuition? Well, we present that person a problem or the world does; the person comes up with a solution very rapidly (maybe the solution is even right); and when you ask that person how he or she arrived at the solution, he or she says, "Well, I don't know, I just used my judgment" or '1 just used my intuition." That is, that person honestly tells you that he or she doesn't know how that decision was formed.
This phenomenon is also familiar under another name. It is exactly the phenomenon of recognition. That's back to recognizing your mother again; it takes you one second. You do it with high reliability, but if I ask how you do it and you try to describe the cues, I don't think very many of you could give me a description of your mother that would allow me to pick her out from the crowd corning through the airport gate. We are able to recognize someone or something with high reliability, without being able to report the processes we use to do it. There is a big indexing device in our heads (I won't describe how it gets that way here, although we know a lot about that). It is a discrimination net that sorts out the stimuli we see in front of us, picks out the familiar ones, picks out the chunks, and thereby gives us access to the information we have about it. And that is recognition. I do not see any phenomena like what is usually called intuition or insight that cannot be explained by the process I call recognition.
Another idea concerning how the mind functions that is widely discussed is that there are two different kinds of mental processes, one set of them is controlled by the left half of our brains (in right-handed people) and the other set by the right half of our brains. It is well known that there are differences between the two halves of the brain. All you have to do to prove that is to get hit on one side or the other of your head. Things are very different if you get hit on the left side of your head than if you get hit on the right side of your head. Very often, you can get hit badly on the right side of the head and really never know the difference. Seldom is that the case for the left. So there are differences. But we shouldn't stop there. We know, for example, that recognition of visual patterns has something special to do with the right side, mat almost everything verbal has to do with the left side, and almost everything analytic has to do with the left side.
Some people have concluded from mis mat there is analytic thinking and intuitive thinking. I know absolutely no evidence to support that division. There is nothing really serious you can do without using both sides of your head, and particularly the left side. Some parts of the right side don't seem to be very heavily used, most of the time, but I don't know of any shred of evidence that there are these two species of thinking.
Of course, thinking is more analytic sometimes and more intuitive at other times. In particular, the thinking of experts dealing with ordinary situations is highly intuitive. It becomes analytic only when the going gets tough, when novelty enters into it, when new problems have to be solved. So all of us, if we are to lead productive lives as experts, have to have good equipment both with respect to our recognition capabilities and with respect to our analytic capabilities. We shouldn't suppose that we can go through life being either an intuitive thinker or an analytic thinker. The analytic thinker never would have time to get 8 hours' work done in 8 hours without a large component of intuitive reactions, and the intuitive thinker would never be able to deal with any kind of novelty or any level of difficulty above the routine, without a good deal of analytic capability.
I will not say anything about the computerization of expertise but, obviously, as we begin to understand what an expert is, we can attempt to get a computer to share some of its power, to become a partner in the expertise. Today there are computer programs of quite high quality for medical diagnosis. As far as I know, none is in general use. I think one of the reasons is the problem of who is going to be legally liable for the diagnoses; doctors are a little bit sensitive about issues of legal liability these days. But making use of the notion that a large part of diagnosis is recognition, there have been built a good many expert systems today. The realm of application of expert systems is growing rapidly and is based in considerable part on what we have been learning about the human decision-making process.
Educatio nal Adminis tration Quarterl y CONC LUSIO N: DECIS ION MAKI NG AND MANA GEME NT
I would like to draw a bounda ry now around decisio n'makin g and make the obvious stateme nt that of course decisio n making is not the whole story of manage ment, because decisio ns do have to be implem ented. Much of the effort of manage rs is not just devoted to making decisio ns, includi ng all the aspects I have mention ed, but to implem enting them. We could try to write down a theory of that, a theory of actually acting like a manage r and lots of people have. You have all read the textboo ks (maybe I even wrote one or two of them). There is someth ing awfully disappo inting about those books. They sound like commo n sense. We shouldn 't be too disgust ed about that; commo n sense is a good thing, but then why do you have to write a book about it? What would you want a manage r to know and do? Make decisio ns when needed , that's the focus of attentio n in busines s. Make sure that the decision s are carried out; build organiz ational loyalty and underst anding; delegat e; enlist the whole organiz ation's resourc es in reachin g decisio ns. I haven't even used up one class hour, and the whole course is over.
Most of us know these things, and even most of our student s know them or very quickly learn them after the first week of our teachin g. The only thing that keeps us from being great manage rs, if we aren't great manage rs, is that we don't have the habit of doing these things. Some of them are unpleas ant. Very few manage rs are sadistic enough to enjoy discipli ning their employ ees. Very few of us get pleasur e from dealing with mistake s, particul arly our own. "Cover ing up" happen s with great regular ity in organiz ations.
Very few of us find it pleasan t to make choices in dilemm as. By dilemm a, I mean a situatio n in which all of the choices have really unsatisf actory consequ ences. We know that human beings behave qualitat ively in a differen t way when faced with dilemm as than when faced with ordinar y choices . A child may hesitate betwee n chocola te and strawbe rry, but not for long, if he or she cannot get both. But betwee n castor oil, and some other distaste ful alternat ive, people hesitate a long time.
Trainin g manage rs turns out to be much more like training athletes than like educati ng scientis ts. But that might be wrong because , come to think of it, proper habits are probabl y also the key to good science . We may be exagge rating the formal aspect of the training of scientis ts. Someti mes when I am dealing with my doctora l student s, which is a kind of apprent iceship, I really think that I am practici ng psychia try without a license. The problem is not what they know or don't know, the problem is not how smart they are or aren't, the problem is whethe r they can establis h in themse lves habits that make good scientis ts.
We have advanced a very long way in our understanding of the decisionmaking process. We have something to say about decision making not merely in laboratory situations but also in real-life situations. But I don't want to pretend that we really know as much as we ought to know about the training task: not merely how you give people knowledge but how you develop and mold habits in people, which is a major task in management training. It doesn't usually happen in universities (I won't speak for schools of education, because I have never been in one, but in schools of business it certainly doesn't). If it doesn't happen in the university, men it has to happen after the manager-to-be has left the university.
In conclusion, I am saying, first of all, that we now have a considerable understanding of managerial decision making. The processes that are involved in it are identical with the processes we have been rinding in every kind of psychological thinking and decision-making situation. There are no mysteries in it; there is no magic in it; there is no left brain/right brain romance in it. We can teach many aspects of it; we can certainly teach people to be alert to the processes, whether or not we are successful in creating new habits. We can say a lot about attention directing and the intelligence operation, using that term to mean gathering the information about the environment that is necessary for effective attention directing. We can say a great deal now about the generation of alternatives: how human beings through the chunks that they have in memory, the knowledge they have, are able to search their environments very selectively. We can say a lot about the role of knowledge in expertise.
Earlier I emphasized the 50,000 chunks of information possessed by experts. What I forgot to mention is that nobody, including child prodigies, reaches world-class expertise in any domain (and a lot of them have been studied by now) with less than 10 years of intense application. Mozart was composing music at age 4; Mozart composed no world-class music until at least age 17, as a minimum estimate. Four from 17 is 13. Nobody reaches world-class expertise in any domain with less than 10 years of intense application. We know a lot about the process. Benjamin Bloom, in the School of Education at Chicago, has done some fascinating studies with his students on exceptional talent, as has my colleague, John R. Hayes. So we know an awful lot about this process, and we should be able to put that knowledge to work in our schools in teaching people to acquire expertise. We can increasingly make aspects of expertise automatic, through the classical operations research (OR) tools and also the new artificial intelligence (AI) tools that are based directly on this psychological knowledge.
Finally, and equally important, effective management consists of combining this knowledge and these skills with the habit of applying them. I think Educa tional Adm inistr ate Quar terly one of our great chall enge s is to learn how, with in instit ution s of highe r learn ing, we can prov ide that skill train ing (I will use mat dirty word ). How can we prov ide the skill train ing that is so nece ssary in conju nctio n with the know ledge we are also tryin g to impa rt to our stude nts?
QUE STIO NS FRO M THE AUD IENC E
Ques tion: Wha t parti cular aspec t of decis ion maki ng or prob lem solvi ng invo lves a shift of parad igm, a move ment from one repre senta tion of the prob lem to anoth er repre senta tion of the prob lem?
* Answ er: That is a topic now that's recei ving a lot of resea rch atten tion. It is clear ly one of the more diffic ult aspec ts of prob lem solvi ng, and so we have put it off for a few years , but now it is a very activ e area of resea rch. Fortu natel y, of cours e, most of the time we don' t have to chan ge our paradigm . Mos t of the time, the expe rt enco unter s fami liar prob lems , and one of the thing s that he or she is at once remi nded of is an appro priat e repre senta tion or parad igm for deali ng with that prob lem. If you prese nt a parti cular prob lem to an engin eer, the respo nse may be, "Oh, that is that calcu lus prob lem" or "I had bette r use parti al diffe renti al equa tions on that" or what ever the case migh t be. So, fortu natel y for us, one of the thing s we learn as pan of our educ ation is a colle ction of parad igms that we bring to bear on probl ems. Som e inter estin g work has been done on high scho ol algeb ra, so-ca lled algeb ra story prob lems , whic h show s that a majo r diffe rence betw een good and bad prob lem solve rs in algeb ra is that the good prob lem solve rs are able to class ify the prob lem accu rately in such a way mat the right parad igm is invok ed. Poor prob lem solve rs don't ; they look at supe rficia l aspec ts of the prob lem rathe r than the thing s that really deter mine the parad igm. They look at a prob lem and say, "Thi s is abou t airpl anes, " rathe r than sayin g, "This prob lem must be the same as those river boat prob lems , beca use whet her it is an airpl ane or a boat, it still invol ves relati ve moti on." Mich eline Chi, at the Lear ning Rese arch and Deve lopm ent Cent er at the Univ ersity of Pittsburg h, has done some very inter estin g work on that parti cular task. Ther e are some prob lems that are almo st impo ssibl e until you get the right parad igm, and the ques tion is how that come s abou t. Som e of you may know the prob lem of the muti lated chec kerbo ard. You have a chec kerbo ard and some domi noes ; each domi no cove rs exac tly two squa res of the board , so you can cove r the whol e chec kerbo ard with 32 domi noes . No probl em, a child could do that. Now some malic ious perso n come s along and snips out the north west squa re and the south east squa re of your chec kerbo ard, and you only have 62 squa res left Can you cove r what 's left with 31 domi noes ?
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When you give that problem to people, they have a represen tation of it, they have a paradig m. They try coverin g the board with domino es, but alas, it never quite works, mere are always a couple of squares left over. After about an hour or 2, even if you pay your subjects , they begin to get pretty frustrate d. Either because they are exceptio nally good at mis game, or exceptio nally persiste nt, or more often because you give them some hints, suddenl y it occurs to them that the uncover ed squares , the ones that they can't cover are always the same color. And shortly after that occurs to them, they notice that each domino covers one red and one black square. They say, "Oh, after the mutilati on, I now have two less squares of one color than the other. So, of course, because every domino covers one square of each color, no matter how many domino es I have I can't cover unequal number s of the two colors." End of problem .
That is a paradig m shift. Now we know a good deal about it. We know that people don't come equippe d with a list of paradig ms that they tick off and say, "If this one doesn't work I will try that one." There are a zillion potentia l paradigm s. What subjects do, occasio nally, is to focus on things that, under all their actions, remain invarian t in the situation . In the midst of the whole confusio n, we are always surroun ded by, a few things stay constan t, and human beings are well tuned to look for constan ts, to look for the invarian t. That is what science is all about, finding invarian ce in confusi ng phenom ena. Those subjects who are particul arly good at focusin g attentio n on invarian ce sometim es themsel ves discove r the properti es that lead to the change of paradig m and the solution . There is now more research going on of this kind, but I wouldn 't pretend that we are anywhe re near the whole story of where new paradig ms come from. We do know they don't come very often.
Many of us learned calculus , but only Newton invented it
Questio n: I think we need to ask seriousl y whether we are devotin g enough of our attentio n in the curricul um and in what we do in the classroo m to, first, develop ing these percepti on skills of acquirin g the chunks that enable people to recogni ze the cues in situation s and, second, whether we are doing enough on the habits.
Answer : Let me take up the first topic, of percept ual skills. Conside r the textbook s. Every algebra textboo k will tell you what rules you can apply to an equation without changin g the value of the unknow n. You know you can add and subtract , multiply and divide, as long as you do the same thing to both sides. Fine, we teach that in Week 3; in Week 4, we teach solving equation s. But, if you look at Week 4 in the textboo ks (at least in any textboo ks I have examine d), you will find preciou s little informa tion about when you should add or subtract or multiply or divide, how to figure that out by looking at the equation , or how much you should add or subtract or 41t Edncat ioial Admini stration Quarter ly multip ly or divide. Now mere are some simple rules for that As a matter of fact, they are so simple that we have written a progra m for a compu ter, a so-call ed adaptiv e produc tion system , allowin g that compu ter to examin e a few worke d-out examp les of solutio ns of algebra ic equatio ns and men to reprog ram itself to solve algebra equatio ns. On the basis of what we learned by writing that progra m, we decide d that studen ts could also learn effecti vely by studyin g approp riate worked -out examp les. And we now have a largescale experim ent going in China. At any rate, the experim ent shows that we have very effecti ve algebra instruc tion, with almost no lecture s, with the primar y activity of studen ts being the study of worked -out examp les plus proble m solving . This is not just discov ery learnin g (I can give you reason s why just discov ery learnin g is not the answer ) but nearly total relianc e on worke d-out examp les. That experim ent came straigh t out of the theory, and there are a lot of applica tions for it in algebra . It require s that we teach the percep tual pattern s that studen ts need to learn to recogn ize cues and know what to do and when to do it By teachin g cue recogn ition, I don't just mean lecturi ng about it; we have to provid e studen ts with experie nces with which they train themse lves to recogn ize these chunks .
Your second questio n is a tough one, and part of the reason it is tough is what I sugges ted a little earlie r skill is a dirty word around univer sities. If you put the word vocatio nal in front of it, you are really damne d. If someth ing is "usefu l," oh goodne ss! But we really have to face up to the questio n of whethe r a univer sity is capabl e of trainin g habits as well as impart ing knowl edge and if that is a reason able thing to do in a univers ity. If the univer sity is an approp riate setting in which to do it, we'd better find some way of changi ng our attitude s toward that part of the task. And that proble m I will turn over to the politic al scienti sts or the sociolo gists.
Questi on: How can we use compu ters to improv e teachin g effectiv eness? What about compu ter-aid ed instruc tion?
Answe r: You may have noticed that, althoug h I have spent the last 35 years of my life talking more to compu ters than to people , I didn't really say very much about compu ters here. Of course , I think that techno logy has an enorm ous role to play. It is already playin g an enorm ous role in keepin g our books. I don't just mean the family books, I mean our compa ny books. It has change d our organi zationa l lives in all sorts of nonfun damen tal respec ts already . But I don't think it has* change d them in very many fundam ental respec ts, and likewis e our educat ional practic es. Compu ter-aid ed instruc tion just is not here; it is just not import ant. Does anybod y think it is an import ant part of the schem e? We haven 't even incorp orated televis ion into instruc tion, except in a very limited and superfi cial way. It took only 10 years for the movie s to drive vaudev ille out of this countr y (profes sional perform ers to
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drive out the amateurs ). I am at a loss to explain why that has not happened in the universiti es. That is a whole discussio n by itself.
But let me get back to the question about technolog y. I think technolog y has an enormous role to play, and it is only going to play it to the extent that the technolog y is intelligen t. We talk about living in an informati on age, as indeed we do, but the main character istic of that informati on age is mat informati on has ceased to be a scarce resource; we are drowning in it Human attention has become the scarce resource. So any time you bring a machine in, you better ask how much informati on it is going to take in and how much it is going to give out And unless it takes in three orders of magnitud e more than it gives out, don't buy it, don't let it in the door. To achieve that ratio (that it can take in three times as many orders of magnitud e more than it gives out), it has to be intelligen t Because it can't spew anything out at random, it has to have the kind of selectivit y that chess players have so they don't look at the 10* possibilit ies or even 10*.
The future of high technolog y in our education al society and our productive society generall y is very much tied to the degree to which we understan d human intelligen ce and, hence, are able to build computer s that really can collabora te with us and can contribut e their intelligen ce to the total intelligen ce of the task.
That is happenin g, and it is not necessari ly happenin g in computer science departme nts, or even mainly in computer science departme nts. Most of it is going to be produced by users who don't even think they are doing artificial intelligen ce, who just have an idea about how to get a computer to do somethin g interestin g. You see that happenin g now in research; you see it happenin g in chemistry ; you see it happenin g in physics. Increasin gly, the computer is becoming the laborator y chemist's or laborator y physicist 's right-han d person, and that is going to spread to other areas as well.
